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The historical evolution of the real exchange rate in most LDCs,
with periods of gradual appreciation followed by massive depre-
ciations, implies that the standard variability measures are not
valid for comparing real exchange rate uncertainty across coun-
tries.
The Policy, Research, and ExLemal  Affairs Complex distnbutes PRE Working Papers todissemnnate the findings of work tn progress and
to encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and aU  others interested in development issucs. These papers carry the names of
the authors, reflect only their views, and should be used and cited accordLngly.  The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions are the

















































































































1  Policy,  Research,  and External  Affairs
Trade  Policy
WPS 791
This paper--  a product of'thc Trade Polic) Division, Country Economics Department --is part of a larger
ef'fort in PRE to cxaniic  Itlc  implicationis  ofexchange rate policy for economic performance.  Copies are
availabic free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Karla
Cabana, room N 10-037, extension 37947 (26 pages).  October 1991.
Exchange rate policy has receivcd renewed  skewness andi  excess kurtosis (increased prob-
attention becausc of' its prominent role in adjust-  ability of tail events).
mcnt programs.  Several analysts have cxamined
the impact of real exchange rate uncertainty on  *  This asymmetric non-normality implies that
the performance of such economic variables as  the common pti c ice of using the standard
GDP growth, exports, and investiment,  deviation (or coefficient of variation) to compare
real exchange rate uncertainty across countries is
Pritchett uses data on tile real exchiange  rate  not justified.
for 56 developing countries with managed
exchange rates to make three points:  Empirically, the higher order moments
(skewness and kurtosis) are at least as important
- The distribution of annual changes in rcal  as the standard deviation in explaining cross-
cxchange rates is highly non-normal -boLh  country performanct
The IRE Working Paper Series disseniinaies the finldings  of wo,k under way in the Bank's Policy, Rcscarch, and Extemal
Affairs Compex.  An objective (,fthc series  i  to  get tliese findings out quickly, even  if presentations  arc less than fully polkihed.
The Findings,  interpretations, and conclusion's in these papers do not necessarily represent olficial Bank policy.
Produced by the PRE Disscmination CcnterMeasuring  Real  Exchange  Rate  Instability
in  Developing  Countries:
Empirical  Evidence  and  Implications
by
Lant Pritchett
Table  of Contents
I.  The evolution of the  RER in developing  countries  3
II.  Evolution  of RER asymmetry  iand  non-normality  of exchange  4
rate  changes
A.  Testing  for  asymmetry  of RER changes  6
B.  Kurtotic  distributions  9
C.  Testing  for asymmetry  in kurtotic  distributions  14
III.  Measuring  RER  variability  16
A.  Measuring  variability  16
IV.  Higher  order  moments  and  economic performance  19
Conclusion  22
Appendix  Table  A.1  24
Bibliography  25Measuring real exchange rate instability in developing countries:
Empirical evidence and implications
The  real  exchange  rate  (RER) has  received  increasing  attentioki  as  a
critical relative price.  Realignment of an overvalued RER has been one of the
critical components of adjustment programs supported by the World Bank (Thomas,
et. al., 1990,  Conway, 1991).  This increased attention has stimulated research
into  the impact  of exchange rate  policy on  overall  economic performance.  Several
recent papers have shown an empirical association between RER variability and
various indicators of economic performance: output growth (Cottani,  Cavallo and
Khan,  1990,  Dollar,  1990, and  Lopez,  1991),  export  performance  (Corbo and
Caballero, 1990), and investment (Serven  and Solimano, 1991,  Faine and de Melo,
1990).
This paper contributes  to the discussion of the empirical link between the
RER and economic performance by providing evidence for  three facts about the RER
in  LDCs.  First, for nearly all LDCs with managed exchange rates the historical
distribution of annual RER innovations is asymimetric  (a  pronounced tendency to
large  RER  depreciations)  and  has  very  fat  tails  relative  to  the  normal
distribution.  Second, because the distribution of RER changes  is different
across countries, comparing the commonly used RER variability statistics (such
as the standard deviation or coefficient of  variation) across countries does not
convey any reliable information  whatsoever.  Therefore, finding (or  not finding)
a statistical  association across  countries  between  the variability  of  the RER  and
some performance variable by itself can convey no information about the impact
of  RER "uncertainty."  Third,  the higher  order moments of  the distribution of  RER
changes (skewness and kurtosis) are empirically better correlates of economic
performance than the standard variability statistics  which suggests  that further
research  is needed into patterns of RER evolution and their consequences for
economic performance.
This paper has four  sections and  a conclusion. The first  briefly discusses
RER determination in LDCs.  The second examines the empirical evidence for the
non-normality of exchange rate changes,  and illustrates  massive skewness towards
large  depreciations.  The  third section discusses  comparing "variability"  across3
countries  and  shows  that  1)  different  variability  statistics  pr_duce
substantially  different  rankings  and  2)  that  countries  with  tha  same  RER
variability n.ay  nevertheless have very different RER uncertainty.  The fourth
reports some simple cross-country regressions that illustrate the surprisingly
large empirical importance of the higher order moments (skewness and kurtosis)
of  the  distribution  of  RE,' changes  in  regressions  explaining  economic
performance.
I)  The evolution of the RER in developing countries
The developed countries  have  moved, since  the  collapse  of the  Bretton  Woods
arrangements in 1973, towards a policy of more or less freely floating exchange
rates, at least across major currency areas.  On the other hand, nearly all
developing countries actively  control the  nominal exchange rate.  Exchange rates
are generally pegged to a currency, or composite of currencies.  The frequency
of revision of the exchange rate peg varies, with countries pursuing a managed
float revising frequently, while other countries adjust annually or less.  Table
1 shows the distribution of developing countries' exchange rate arrangements in
1982.
In the classical discussion the equilibrium real exchange rate was shown
to be invariant to the choice of fixed or floating nominal exchange rates.  The
question was simply whether nominal exchange rates or national price levels,
through the money supply, should adjust to reach equilibrium.  As a matter of
historical practice allowing the domestic price levels to rise more slowly than
international prices  has  not been  widely  observed  in LDCs.  In  developing
countries faced  with an appreciated RER the common pattern has been to "defend"
overvalued exchange rates and resist nominal devaluations.  Governments try to
staunch  the incipient  current  account  deficit  generated  by  overvaluation imposing
increasingly  severe  restrictions  on  both  the capixal  and  current  account  payments
while  simultaneously attempting to mitigate the effects of overvaluation on
marginal exporters.  This disequilibrium process often ends in a crisis, with a4
Table 1:  Exchange Rate Arrangemerts of Developing Countries, March 31, 1982
Limited
Flexibility
Pegged  French  against  single  Managed  Independently
US  dollar  SDR  Franc  Composite  currency  Floating  Ftoating
Chile  Burma  Benin  Bangladesh Guyana  Brazit  Argentina'
Ecuador  Jordan  Burkina  China  Philippines  Bolivia  Costa  Rica 2
Paraguay  Kenya  Faso  MaLaysia  Ghana  Colombia  S. Africa
Venezuela  Malawi  Cameroon  Algeria  Peru
Dominican  Rep  Mauritius  GAF  Tunisia  Uruguay
EL  Salvador  Sierra  Leone Congo  Mauritania  Mexico
Guatemala  Zaire  CIV  Tanzania  India
Haiti  Zambia  Madagascar  Zimbabwe  Korea
Honduras  Mali  Pakistan
Jamaica  Niger  Sri  Lanka
Panama  Senegal  Thaitland











Notes: 1) FLoated  December  24,  1981  after  a  period  of  pro-announced  rates.
2) Since  January  1981.
massive  jump in ti.e  nominal rate aimed at reestablishing a manageable  RER.I
Krueger (1978) provides an detailed account of this pattern in the 1970s for a
number of LDCs.  The excellent empirical analysis of devaluation episodes in
Edwards (1989,  Ch. 6) and in Kamin (1988)  also reveals increasing  use of import
and foreign exchange payment controls and a sharp fall in imports in  the periods
preceding large devaluations.  This paper examines some empirical implications
of this stylized story.  To the extent that "resisted devaluation" captures a
common experience  with  exchange rate management  in LDCs, RER  levels  should
exhibit infrequent jumps at points where the nominal rate is revalued towards a
more sustainable rate  and  RER innovations  should  have an  asymmetric  distribution.
II)  Evolution of  RER  asymmetry and non-normality of exchanae rate changes
This section examines time series evidence on the evolution of the RER  in
developing  countries.  It is shown that the distribution  of RER  changes is
'  As early as 1967,  prior to floating rates, Kindleberger characterized the
combination of overvalued rates  with current  and capital account  restrictions as
a "disequilibrium system."5
markedly asymmetric, with  a pronounced tendency towards  large depreciations.
Further, the distribution tends to excese kurtosis, with much fatter tails than
the normal (Gaussian) distribution.
A .nultilateral  RER index was constructed for 68 developing countries 2 and
19  OECD and Southern European  countries.  The 68  develcping countries  are  divided
into the primary sample of 56 countries  with managed exchange rates, 10 African
Franc zone countries, and 2 "dollar" developing countries.  The RER index in
period t for country j  is:
J
1)  RERJ  =  Pr
TV  Pt,  eJ
The CPI  of the  home country  (pi)  is used to  proxy the price  of  non-
tradables.  The price of foreign goods (measured  by ep*, where e is the nominal
exchange rate,  local currency per dollar, zii  are the shares of country i in
country J's trade in 1980, pi  are the wholesale prices, in dollars, of country
i)  is used to proxy the price of tradables.  While there are serious objec ions
to this method of measuring the RER, the limitations imposed by multi-country
comparability preclude measuring home and traded goods prices directly as would
be suggested by the popular definition of the RER as the relative price of non-
tradables to tradables.  The defense of this RER index is twofold.  First, even
if it is not theoretically appropriate, this index (or  some variant thereof) is
what is generally  monitored and so is of independent interest.  Secondly, nearly
all of the empirical work on RER variability has used a RER index of this type.
Empirical  work  on RER  behavior has  focussed on the  level of the RER
(Edwards 1989, 1987).  However, evidence strongly suggests that RER levels in
most developing countries are not stationary.  Only two of 56 countries could
reject the standard test for the presence of  a unit root and 42  (75%) have a
2  The RER index for the was constructed by Francis Ng at the World Bank
using  exchange  rate  and price  data  from the  IMF's  International Financial
Statistics and partner trade weights derived from IMF's Direction of Trade.6
statistically significant trend term. 3 Since the variance of a non-stationary
times beries tends to infinity,  the (log)  level  of the RER was first  differenced
before analysis and this paper examines the behavior of these unconditional RER
innovations  :4
2)  A rert  = In (RLRt)  -ln (RERt- 1)
A)  Testina for asymmetry of RER changes
The pattern of "resisted devaluation" described above should produce an
asymmetric  distribution  of  RER  changes,  with  a  tendency  towards  larger
depreciations  than appreciations.5  In order to  examine this hypothesis the
empirical distribution  of each  country's  RER  changes  was tested for  left skewness
using three statistics.  The usual skewness statistic is  the scaled third moment
of the distribution about the mean scaled by the standard error:
3)  b 3 =  1 2 .
This skewness coefficient is zero in any symmetric distribution and is  negative
in a left skewed  distribution,  as deviations  below the  mean are on average larger
than those above the mean.  Two other skewness statistics are also calculated.
The first is the normalized difference of the absolute value of the  largest
depreciation and the largest appreciation:
4)  SI=  X  f  1xl
3  Note that I am not attempting to decide the difficult question whether
the series is better represented as a stochastic or a deterministic trend, only
to establish non-stationarity.
4  Given the agnostic stance toward trend stationarity in footnote 3, the
deviations  from trend  could also have besn  used to  establish  stationarity.
Similar results for  the skewness and  kurtosis of RER innovations are  obtained if
the one step ahead forecast errors from a trend are used.
5  The exchange rate measured used fnllows the "down is down" convention
that a  depreciation, or devaluation  of the  exchange rate is  represented as a fall
in the RER measure (this is 1/RER as defined in equation 1).where the RER changes are  ordered from omallest (Xl)  (i.e.,  biggest depreciation)
to largest (X.)  and a is  the standard deviation.  Values lees  than zero indicate
left  skewness,  as  the  largest  depreciation  is  larger  than  the  largest
appreciation.  Finally, the ratio of the largest depreciation to the absolute
value of the average change is also computed:
5)  S2 4_  I1
[ 1  1/n]
This indicates how much larger the biggest depreciation is than the "typical"
annual change.
Table  2  reports  these  three  skewness  statistics  for  each  of  the  56
developing countries  with managed  nominal exchange  rates. 6 ImpresAively,  the  RER
changes of 47 countries (84%)  were left skewed by the b 3 etatistic and 48 (86%)
by SI.  Of the 38 non-Sub-Saharan African countries in the sample only three
(Peru,  El Salvador and Morocco) failed to show evidence of left skewneas.  The
hypothesis of symmetry (b 3 =  0, SI  =  0)  was tested using critical regions  derived
under the assumption of an undc-lying normal distribution.  Symmetry could be
rejected in favor  of left skewness at the 5% significance level for 34 countries
(61%) by the b3 statistic, and for 29 countries (52%) by Si.  This is strong
evidence that  the  distribution of  annual 7 percentage changes  in the RER  in
developing countries with managed nominal exchange rates has been asymmetric,
with a marked tendency towards large depreciations.
The  magnitude of  these deviations from symmetry  is significant.  The third
co'umn of Table 2 reports  the ratio  of the (absolute  value of) largest deprecia-
tion to the average of the absolute values.  This indicates how much larger  the
"maxi"  depreciation is  than the  RER change in a "typical"  year.  The  median ratio
in the Central America and Caribbean region is 6.0, and in all of the other
6  Excluded  from  those  normally  considered  "developing"  are  the  CPA
countries and Liberia and Panama.
7  Of course this skewness and kurtosis is  even easier to find in  quarterly
data.  Appendix table A.1 shows the skewness statistics for 20 countries using
quarterly data.  Only Malaysia fails to reject left skewness at the 1% level.8
Table  2:  Skewness and kurtosis statistics for  annual percentage RER changes,
1966-1988 for 56 developing countries with managed exchange rates.
b 3 SI  S 2 b4  SR
Skewness  max - min  minl/avg  kurtosis  std range
0
Latin America
Argentina  -1.31**  -1.59**  3.90  1.18*  3.58
Bolivia  -1.31**  -1.12  6.71  6.00**  5.92**
Brazil  -0.24  -0.54  2.99  -0.20  3.98
Chile  -1.09**  -1.77**  5.26  3.44**  5.34**
Colombia  -0.19  -1.04  4.00  1.44**  5.0
Ecuador  -1.52**  -2.11**  5.46  3.61**  4.98**
Paraguay  -0.80*  -3.28*  3.65  0.75  4.14
Peru  0.59  0.58  2.91  1.04  4.63*
Uruguay  -1.48**  -1.38*  3.65  1.66**  3.77
Venezuela  -1.95**  -2.25**  6.13  4.88**  4.45
Region median  -1.20  -1.33  3.95  1.55  4.72
Central America
Costa Rica  -2.98**  -2.98**  10.09  11.61**  5.73**
Dominican Rep  -2.32**  -2.48**  8.25  6.61**  5.19**
El Salvador  0.20  0.50  4.46  4.36**  5.91**
Guatemala  -2.08**  -2.31**  7.16  6.82**  5.44**
Guyana  -3.17**  -3.60**  9.33  12.36**  5.27**
Haiti  -1.00**  -0.95  3.61  1.40**  4.45
Honduras  -1.55**  -1.37*  6.80  6.89**  5.95**
Jamaica  -1.43**  -1.93**  4.73  2.19**  4.48
Mexico  -0.91**  -0.86  ?.39  0.53  3.88
Trinidad  -1.70**  -1.96**  _.21  5.01**  4.98**
Region median  1.62  -1.95  6.01  5.81  5.23
Asia
Bangladesh  -0.16  -0.30  4.49  2.10**  5.11**
Burma  -0.03  0.46  1.85  -0.95  3.54
China  -0.57  -1.95**  3.75  0.89  4.78**
India  -1.51**  -2.67**  4.97  2.38**  4.23
Korea  -0.89-*  -0.82  3.30  0.30  3.94
Malaysia  -0.13  -0.41  2.95  -0.20  4.15
Pakistan  -2.13**  -2.92**  6.73  5.56**  4.75**
Philippines  -1.11**  -1.77**  4.36  1.35**  4.27
Sri  Lanka  -2.62**  -3.65**  7.78  8.67**  4.98**
Thailand  -0.11  -1.08  2.99  -0.59  3.83
Region median  -0.73  -1.42  4.05  1.12  4.25
Middle East & Africa
Algeria  -1.58**  -1.31*  3.36  2.31**  3.82
Egypt  -2.67**  -2.73**  6.60  9.60**  5.05**
Jordan  -1.92**  -2.49**  5.39  5.09**  4.84**
Morocco  0.45  0.23  2.55  0.28  4.26
Syria  -1.84**  -2.04**  5.75  5.59**  5.14**
Tunisia  -1.31**  -2.06**  5.29  3.57**  5.22**
Turkey  -1.29**  -2.30**  4.31  0.88  3.54
Yemen  -1.46**  -2.09**  4.42  2.50  4.27
Region median  -1.52  2.08  4.85  3.04  4.56
Note: **  (*) significant at the 5% (10%) level.9
Table  2:  Skewness and kurtosis statistics for  annual percentage changes in
RER for 53  developing countries  with  managed excIange rates, 1966-
1988 (continued).
b3  SI  S 2 b4  SR
Skewness  max - min  min|/avg  kurtosis  std range
0
Sub-Saharan Africa
Burundi  0.62  0.90  1.88  -0.07  3.90
Ethiopia  -0.16  -0.25  3.61  0.95  4.77**
Ghana  -1.88**  -2.16**  6.25  6.48**  5.30**
Kenya  0.52  0.45  1.97  -0.29  3.80
Madagascar  -3.13**  -3.91**  9.41  11.27**  4.98**
Malawi  -0.59  -1.11  3.34  -0.23  3.82
Mauritania  0.96**  1.56**  1.73  1.00  4.25
Mauritius  0.02  -1.00  2.58  -0.79  3.70
Nigeria  -2.57**  -2.82**  7.20  7.90**  4.98**
Rwanda  -1.97**  -2.13**  6.35  5.47**  4.99**
Sierra Leone  0.05  -0.58  3.31  0.27  4.09
Somalia  0.50  0.40  2.75  0.54  4.08
S. Africa  -0.78*  -1.50**  4.39  1.83**  4.78**
Sudan  0.02  0.17  3.33  1.13*  4.78**
Tanzania  -1.89**  -2.24**  5.50  4.84**  4.83**
Zaire  -2.03**  -2.69**  6.10  6.62**  4.89**
Zambia  -1.42**  -1.37*  6.82  6.77**  6.03**
Zimbabwe  -0.54  -0.94  3.31  0.12  4.03
Region median  -0.57  -1.05  3.47  1.07  4.81
regions except  SSA  the median  is near four 8. The effect on the RER of  the
delayed depreciations, when they do occur, are larger than a typical  "random
shock" by a factor of four.
B) Kurtotic distributions
Some  phenomena of  economic interest  have  distributions that  are  more  peaked
and fatter tailed than the normal, implying a larger relative probability of
observations far into the tails.  The last two columns of table 2 present two
measures  of  fat tails  for our RER  innovations series, the  excess  kurtosis
coefficient which is the scaled fourth moment minus three:
8  In a sample of size 23 from a standard normal sample the average value
of  this statistic would be 2.5.±0
Table 3:  Skewness  statistics  for  annual  percentage  change  in  RER  for
countries of the OECD and Southern  Europe, the Franc Zone and two
"dollar" countries, 1966-1988.
b3 St  S  b4 SR
Skewness  max - mi  min /avg  kurtosis  std range
OECD
Australia  -0.2?  -0.03  4.22  -0.33  4.04
Austria  0.00  -0.42  2.81  1.14*  4.47
Belgium  -0.27  -0.28  2.37  -0.83  3.61
Canada  0.03  0.21  2.00  -1.04  3.59
Switzerland  0.15  0.15  3.63  1.75**  5.23**
Denmark  -0.28  -0.54  2.34  -0.97  3.47
France  0.11  0.59  1.48  -1.34**  3.24
Germany  0.15  0.53  1.68  -0.87  3.42
Italy  0.08  0.25  2.55  -0.12  4.35
Japan  0.08  0.50  1.90  -0.92  3.73
Netherlands  1.25**  1.58**  2.37  2.95**  4.78**
Norway  -0.33  -0.60  2.36  -0.92  3.49
Sweden  0.26  0.45  2.50  0.25  4.13
United Kingdom  - 37  0.55  1. 7  -0.58  3.52
United  States  J.24  0.55  1. 1  -1.02  3.55
Median  0.08  0.25  2.37  -0.92  3.61
Franc Zone
Benin  0.62  0.89  2.07  0.02  4.01
Burkina Paso  0.17  -0.13  3.73  1.52**  4.85**
Cameroon  0.66  1.31*  1.87  0.39  4.12
Central Africa  -0.20  0.28  3.04  1.02  4.90**
Congo  0.03  -0.06  3.79  1.81**  5.21**
Cote d'Ivoire  0.36  0.69  1.65  -0.84  3.41
Mali  0.00  0.04  2.61  -0.29  4.06
Niger  -0.87**  -1.37*  3.56  0.64  4.02
Senegal  1.22**  1.51**  2.30  2.16**  4.54*
Togo  0.80*  0.36  2.49  0.56  3.93
Median  0.27  0.32  2.55  0.60  4.09
S.  Europe
Greece  0.24  0.40  2.08  -0.58  3.79
Hungary  -0.34  -0.58  3.00  -0.16  4.09
Portugai  -0.24  0.18  2.19  -0.44  3.59
Yugoslav  -0.40  -0.92  3.14  0.02  4.13
Median  -0.29  -0.75  2.14  -0.30  3.69
Dollar Countries
Liberia  -0.30  -0.73  2.81  -0.55  3.91
Panama  -0.49  -1.72**  3.53  0.28  4.06
Median  -0.40  -1.23  3.17  -0.14  3.99
Note:  **  (*) - significant  at the  5  (10)%  level.
6)  b 4 =  /4 -3
Te2
The  studentized  range,  which  is the  maximum  less  the  minimum  normalized  by the11
standard error:
7)  SR  X. -X,
0
These  tests  provide  additional  evidence  of  the  non-normality  of  RER
innovations.  Forty eight of the 56  managed exchange rate countries had positive
excess kurtosis.  The studentized  range (SR)  was greater than the expected value
under normality 9 in all but  nine of the countries.  Hypothesis t-^ts for the
excess kurtosis and studentized range reject the null of normality in 36 and 30
of the 56 countries.  For the non-SSA countries 27 (20) of 36 countries could
reject the hypotheeis by the kurtosis (SR)  test.
Table 3  presents the skewness  statistics for  four  other  groups of  countries
for comparison  with the managed exchange rate  developing countries: fifteen  OECD
,.ountries,  four Southern European countries, ten CFA countries and Liberia and
Panama.  The skewness evident for the  managed developing countries is  completely
absent.  Of the 31 countries only one (Niger)  was significantly left skewed by
the  b3 statistic.  Less than half of the countries were negative by  either the
b3 or SI  measure.
Figures 1 and 2 display the histograms of the standardized annual RER
percentage changes for the 56 managed exchange LOCs and the 31 other countries.
The  bars  depict  the  observed  relative  frequency  and the  expected  relative
frequencies under a standard normal distribution are indicated in the graph by
the capped vertical lines.  The left asymmetry is visually evident in Figure 1
from the large number of observations more than 3 standard deviations below the
mean.  Figures - and 4 highlight the asymmetry further by displaying the ratio
of the observed relative frequency  to that of the normal distribution.  For the
IDCs the excess relative frequency of depreciations is immense.  There are three
times too many observations 3.5 deviations below the mean, 57 times too many at
4 deviations and 97 times too many 4.5 or more deviations away.
9  The expected value of the studentized range for a sample of 23 from a
normal distribution is 3.85.12
Figure 1: Histogram of standardized annual RER percentage changes for 56 LDCs
with managed exchange rates, 1966-88.
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Figure 2: Hi.stogram  of standardized annual RER percentage changes for 31 other
countries, 1966-88.
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Figure 3: Excess of actual relative frequency  to expected frequency from normal
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C)  Testing for asymmetry in kurtotic distributions
Before moving to exami.e the implications of asymmetry in cross countLy
comparisons a final statistical  point needs  to be  addressed.  The critical levels
used  in the previous  sections for the skewness and kurtosis  statistics are
generated under the null that the parent distribution is  normal.  However, given
that the distribution is kurtotic (thick tailed), the critical levels for the
skewness statistic generated under the null of normality will not be correct.
In the  small samples available  it is difficult to statistically distinguish
kurtosis (relatively  large  probabilities of extreme observations) from skewness
(tendency  for extreme observations in  one tail).  Deviations from normality due
to skewness, implying an asymmetric process, are of greater economic interest
than fat tails.  To test the hypothesis of skewness independently we need to
determine the distribution of the skewness coefficient under the null of a more
general symmetric, but kurtotic distribution.
The  "student's" t distribution commonly used in hypothesis tests  is a
symmetric  distribution, with a level of kurtosis  that decreases with the degrees
of freedom (v):
8)  b4  =  6
Rejection levels for each of the 1:wo  skewness statistics were generated using
Monte Carlo simulations from t disvributions with varying degrees of freedom.
The rejections levels are reported in Table 6.  For instance, if the parent
distribution is assumed to be normal then values of the skewness statistic (b 3)
greater  (in absolute value)  than  .84 with  a  sample size of  23  indicate a
rejection of the null of no skewness at the 5% level.  However, if the parent
distribution is a t(5), with excess kurtosis of 6,  then the absolute value of b3
needs to exceed 1.87 to reject at the same confidence level.
T;ie  critical  values in  table  6 can  be compared  with the skewness statistics
in  table 2 to check the robustness  of the symmetry tests  to kurtosis.  The  values
of the skewness statistics are so high that many countries are still able to
reject symmetry.  Using the critical values generated from a t(6) distribution15
Table 4:  Critical levels for skewness statistics
b3 Si
Skewness  max -min|
5%  10%  5%  10%
Excess
kurtosis
Normal (0,1)  0  .83  .68  1.49  1.23
Student's t
degrees of freedom
5  6  1.87  1.44  2.38  1.95
6  3  1.60  1.25  2.18  1.82
10  1  1.30  1.02  1.88  1.56
17  (12) of  the  56 countries  could  still reject  symmetry  using  the b3 (S,)
statistic' 0. This is  powerful evidence that the asymmetry in RER behavior is  not
a  statistical  artifact  but  reflects  asymmetries  in  the  process  of  RER
determination in LDCs with managed exchange rates.
The evidence of this section has shown that, unlike the RER behavior for
the  more developed countries  and for  those  developing countries  with continuously
pegged exchange rates,  the ex-post distribution  of percentage changes in  the RER
is  highly  non-normal.  Only  seven  countries  (Brazil, Peru,  Burma,  China,
Malaysia, Thailand and Morocco) are  not significantly non-normal by either t:Ie
skewness or the kurtosis tests."  The non-normality is especially evidenced by
a  tendency to extremely large  depreciations.  This empirical conclusion confirms
the belief that  the resistance  to devaluation leading  to  exchange rate crises  has
in fact  been a  very common  pattern among LDCs.  To some  extent this has been  well
known, as demonstrated in the immense literature on the peso,  problem.  However,
°  These are values for two sided tests.  Using the 10% (or 5% one sided)
significance levels 28 (23)  were able to reject.
"1  Some omnibus tests for non-normality are a combination of the skewness
(b 3) and excess kurtosis (b 4) statistics.  Given that nearly all countries can
reject by either test alone the increased  power from combining  the statistics is
not necessary.16
the implications  for  comparing  uncertainty  of  different,  non-normal  distributions
seems to have been ignored as the next two sections will illustrate.
III)  Measuring RER  variability
Several recent papers have used cross country data to examine the impact
of RER variability on economic outcomes.  Corbo and Caballero  (1990) seek to
demonstrate the negative effect of RER uncertainty on exports.  Dollar (1990)
constructs a  unique measure  of RER overvaluation  and RER variability and  examines
their  impact  on  economic  growth.  Lopez  (1991)  includes  a  term  for  RER
variability in his equations  for capital accumulation and growth.  Cottani,
Cavallo and  Khan (1990)  also show  negative  effects  of RER variability on economic
growth in a cross country sample.  Serven and Solimano (1991) and Faini and de
Melo (1990) (or  coefficient of variation) show a negative  RER variability impact
on  investment.  All  of  these papers  use the  standard deviation  to measure
variability.  Section II shows that RER  changes are not normally distributed in
most countries and that the distribution of RER changes  is  very different across
countries.  This implies  that comparisons  of  RER variability  across countries  are
ambiguous, in two ways.  First, different variability statistics may produce
considerably different country rankings.  Second, countries that are ranked as
having the same amount of variability may have very different distributions and
hence cannot be ranked by uncertainty.
A)  Measuring variability
With  non-normality  many different  measures  of dispersion  are  possible  which
may produce quite distinct rankings of RER variability none of which has any
necessary a  priori justification  as "the"  measure of  variability.  In table 6  the
countries  were ranked from  most  to least "variable"  by three  different dispersion
statistics: tne standard deviation, the mean absolute deviation (MAD), and the
interquartile range (IQR).  These variability measures differ the treatment of
the deviations.  The interquartile range ignores the tails completely while the
standard deviation squares the deviations.17
The rank correlation between the standard deviation and the interquartile
range was only  .68 and the average absolute difference in the ranks was 10".
A cross country correlation of .68  is  quite high for  two different variables,  but
these are presumably measuring the same characteristic (RER  variability) and by
this standard the correlation must be considered low.  Since the interquartile
range  is insensitive to the tails the rankings of some countries which have
generally  low  dispersion  but  one  or  two  large  depreciations  are  changed
dramatically.  Dominican Republic  and Costa Rica for example,  have a  large
standard deviation (8th and 21st largest of the 56 countries) yet a very small
interquartile range (50th  and 55th of 56).  The correlation between the standard
deviation and the MAD, which puts less weight to extreme observations, was .78
with  average  absolute  rank  difference of  8.  When  the  RER  is  distributed
differently  in  each  country  then  calculating  a  summary  statistic  for  the
dispersion of  each will  produce a ranking  by  RER uncertainty,  but another equally
plausible statistic could (and  does) produce a quite different country ranking.
The second dangerous aspect in measuring RER variability by the standard
deviation is that countries with roughly the same standard deviation may well
have had completely different evolution of the RER.  A  simple example will
illustrate.  Imagine two  countries which have domestic inflation on average
higher than international inflation.  One country sets the nominal rate at the
beginning of each year equal to the expected inflation differential.  Domestic
prices are then set equal to the average rate plus a random shock.  The ex-post
RER will be variable due to the uncertainty of domestic inflation.  A second
country has no uncertainty about domestic prices but holds the nominal exchange
rate fixed for a long period, generating an appreciating RER.  At the end of the
period the initial period RER is re-established with a maxi-devaluation.  The
first country's RER is will be on average correctly valued, with only random
deviations.  The second country's exchange rate will be on average overvalued.
However, in  Table 6 an example is  constructed  of the evolution of  these RER under
12  If  the rankings were identical  the value of the mean absolute difference
in the ranks would be zero and if the rankings were uncorrelated the expected
value would be 19 in a sample of size 56.18
Table 5:  Country rankings for  RER uncertainty, by three alternative statistics
Standard  Means abs  Inter-quartile
deviation  deviation  range
Latin America  value rank  value rank  value  rank
Argentina  32.2  3  14.1  2  33.8  2
Bolivia  36.6  2  6.1  17  19.7  6
Brazil  9.6  33  4.7  28  14.7  12
Chile  20.9  9  10.0  4  23.7  4
Colombia  7.8  42  3.5  45  7.4  44
Ecuador  11.6  30  5.7  19  12.6  20
Paraguay  12.8  22  6.1  16  13.2  18
Peru  13.7  17  7.0  12  15.1  11
Uruguay  19.2  12  8.1  8  14.7  13
Venezuela  12.7  23  3.6  43  8.3  41
Central America
Costa Rica  12.8  21  3.1  47  4.7  55
Dominican Rep  21.0  8  5.7  18  6.4  50
El Salvador  12.6  25  5.2  25  13.3  17
Guatemala  9.3  36  2.6  51  6.0  52
Guyana  14.5  15  4.2  34  8.4  38
Haiti  6.6  48  4.3  33  8.7  35
Honduras  8.6  38  1.9  55  6.7  47
Jamaica  12.9  19  6.9  13  12.8  19
Mexico  12.6  26  4.6  30  10.9  26
Trinidad  9.5  34  3.8  39  10.1  29
Asia
Bangladesh  12.7  24  3.6  44  7.9  42
Burma  10.7  31  8.1  7  19.1  7
China  7.0  47  3.8  38  9.1  33
India  5.3  50  2.8  50  4.3  56
Korea Rep  9.3  35  4.6  32  9.8  30
Malaysia  4.5  52  2.4  53  5.1  54
Philippines  8.5  39  5.0  26  9.4  31
Sri Lanka  13.5  18  5.4  24  8.5  37
Thailand  3.5  55  2.8  49  6.4  49
Middle  East & Africa
Algeria  7.3  44  3.8  37  6.9  46
Egypt  15.9  14  5.7  20  14.5  14
Jordan  7.1  46  3.8  40  8.5  36
Morocco  3.9  54  2.0  54  6.7  48
Syria  22.8  7  5.5  22  21.5  5
Tunisia  5.0  51  1.9  56  5.1  53
Turkey  12.8  20  7.5  10  14.2  15
Yemen  14.4  16  7.0  11  17.9  9
these two assumptions over 23 years.  The standard deviations of the (log  first
differenced)  series  are identical.  However,  the  skewness and kurtosis  are
obviously completely different, indicating the completely different pattern of
RER changes.
One would not expect the response of the economies to the two RER policies
would be a;:  all similar even though the standard deviations were equal.  While19
Table 5:  Country  rankings  for  RER  uncertainty,  by  three  alternative
statistics (continued)
Standard  Means abs  Inter-quartile
deviation  deviation  range
Sub-Saharan Africa value rank  value rank  value  rank
Burundi  7.7  43  5.6  21  11.4  24
Ethiopia  9.3  37  3.7  41  12.0  21
Ghana  51.1  1  22.7  1  48.7  1
Kenya  4.1  53  2.8  48  7.3  45
Madagascar  23.6  6  7.8  9  10.3  28
Malawi  5.8  49  3.7  42  8.3  39
Mauritania  7.8  41  5.5  23  10.8  27
Mauritius  3.2  56  2.6  52  6.1  51
Nigeria  27.9  4  9.6  5  13.9  16
Rwanda  12.5  27  3.3  46  8.3  40
Sierra Leone  12.2  28  4.9  27  11.7  23
Somalia  18.8  13  6.4  15  16.7  10
South Africa  8.4  40  4.0  35  8.7  34
Sudan  12.0  29  4.7  29  11.9  22
Tanzania  20.4  10  9.0  6  18.9  8
Zaire  27.8  5  12.5  3  29.5  3
Zambia  19.6  11  6.5  14  11.3  25
Zimbabwe  7.2  45  4.6  31  9.2  32
the example is  deliberately artificial the values for the variance and skewness
are within the ranges of those observed in the sample.  Clearly the observed
range  of  variation  in  the  sample  suggests  that  the  differences  in  the
distribution of RER changes are substantial.  For instance, Brazil  (9.6) and
Costa Rica (12.6)  have roughly the same standard deviation and yet Brazil's ARER
series exhibits  neither skewness  not  excess kurtosis, in  contrast  to  Costa Rica's
ARER which has both.
comparing dispersion statistics across countries implicitly assumes that
the samples are drawn from a common family of distributions.  Only in that case
could one infer greater uncertainty, in the usual sense of a mean preserving
spread of a distribution (Rothschild  and Stiglitz, 1970) from observed standard
deviations.  If one distribution is symmetric and another skewed, rankings by
"uncertainty" in the usual sense are not possible.  This creates a serious
problem when attempting to compare RER "uncertainty" across countries.
IV)  Higher order moments and economic performance
The  importance  of  the  non-normal  and  asymmetric  distribution  of  RER
innovations is  that RER variability potentially captures  two distinct aspects of20
Table 6:  Empirical  example  to  two  RER  paths  with  same  a,  but  different
distribution (moments of A rer)
over-  standard
Country type  valuation  deviation  skewness  kurtosis
"Variable inflation"  0%  .240  0  0
"Resisted devaluation"  53%  .240  -4.2  17.69
v  = .10,  7r=  .05, ard  =  .1, 23 years
r-ER  behavior.  First,  variability increases  with general uncertainty.  Secondly,
variability can be a reflection of the dramatic reversal after the pursuit of
unsustainable  policies.  The  statistical  significance  of  a  cross  country
association  of  RER  variability  w,th  economic  performance  is  not  able  to
distinguish between the effect of greater general uncertainty and the effects  of
fact  that  massive  changes  in  the  RER  result  from  the  stop-go  pursuit  of
unsustainable  macro  policies  through  resisted  devaluations.  This  section
illustrates this difficulty by the simple example of adding the higher order
moments (b 3 and b 4) to the growth and export performance regressions.
Table 7  reports cross-country  regressions  with  growth rate  of  export  volume
and real GDP per worker (least squares growth rates) over the 1966-88 period as
the dependent variable and statistics summarizing the  higher moments of the
distrioution of the RER over the same  period as regressors.' 3 Column A of table
7  gives  the results of  regressing  economic performance indicators  on  the standard
deviation of RER changes.1 4 In column B the higher order moments are added.15
For both measures of economic performance the association is much stronger with
the higher order  muments (skewness  and  kurtosis) of  RER changes  than the standard
13 These of course have no interpretation as structural models.  Linear
regression is used simply to control for the impact of other variables.
14 This is very highly correlated with the standard deviation of deviations
from a trend, which is actually what is commonly used.
15  Adding the mean of the log first difference of the RER is insignificant
and does not affect the other results.21
deviation.  The  R2 more than doubles with the inclusion of b 3 and b 4 in the
export growth regression.  There are two implications.  The first is that not
finding an important role for  RER variability does not  mean that RER behavior is
unimportant.  The second is  that finding a significant effect of RER variability
does not imply that uncertainty is important.
As an empirical illustration of the first point, I find that, after the
inclusion of the higher order moments, the statistical significance of c in the
export volume regression is quite  fragile to sample selection.  If Ghana is
excluded' 6 the a term is not significant even at the 10% level.  On the other
hand, the higher order terms are still very important.  This illustrates a case
in which  RER variability measured by a would  fail to  find an impact of RER
variability while the higher order moments are very significant.  The conclusion
from a regression with no  significant coefficient on  a that the  pattern of
instability of RER behavior had little impact on export performance would be
quite wrong.
Conversely, finding a role for RER variability need not imply a role for
uncertainty.  Both  the  skewness  (b 3)  and  excess  kurtosis  statistics  are
normalized by the standard  deviation, implying  that these  measures are invariant
to transformations that increase the standard deviation without altering the
underlying shape of  the distribution.  Nevertheless the  rank correlation between
the skewness and the standard deviation is -.46.  The rank correlation between
excess kurtosis and  the standard  deviation is .55. In other  words, the departure
of the higher order mome-.cs  from normality is associated with higher measured
standard deviations.  This raises the possibility that RER variability effects
attributed to uncertainty are actually independent effects of the higher order
moments, which may represent other features of RER behavior.
Based  on this evidence there is no  question that  more careful attention to
what is meant by "uncertainty" and why it affects real variables like export
growth is needed.
16 Ghana's a of 51.1 (see  table 6) is nearly 60% larger  than that of the next
highest country (Argentina at 32.2).22
Table 7:  Export performance and distribution of RER changes, 1966-88 for
49 non-oil exporting LDCs with managed exchange rates.
Export Volume  GDP per Worker
growth  growth
A  B  A  B
Standard deviation (a)  -163  -.153  -.095  -.084
(.055)**  (.058)**  (.024)**  (.025)*
Skewness (b 3)  -.026  -.011
(.008)**  (.003)**
Kurtosis (b 4)  -.008  -.004
(.002)**  (.001)**
.144  .287  .246  .38
N  46  46  46  46
Standard errors in parenthesis
Note  - *(**),  significant  at the  5(1)%  level.
Conclusion
This paper firmly  establishes one stylized fact and  examines two practical
implications of  this  fact.  The  recent historical process of  exchange rate
management in  many LDCs had produced a  distinctive pattern  of changes in  the RER.
Changes tend to be skewed, with large depreciations of the real exchange rate
much  more  likely  than  equal  sized appreciations.  This  fact  implies  that
theoretical and empirical discussions of the impact of RER uncertainty need to
be much more careful as the term "RER variability" iB  ambiguous in two senses.
Different  dispersion  measures  produce  distinct  (although  not  completely
dissimilar)  rankings  of variability  across  countries.  Second,  countries  with the
same variability (as  measured, for instance,  by  the standard deviation)  may have
had  widely  different  evolution  of  the  RER.  Finally  an  empirical  example
demonstrates  that  differences in  the  distribution  of exchange  rate  changes  beyond
the  variability  are quite  strongly associated with  economic  performance  as
measured by average export growth or GDP per worker.  In  particular, for a given
standard deviation,  an  increase  in  kurtosis  (increased probability  of tail
events) has a strong negative association with economic performance.  Further,
a  result  that is  more of a puzzle, is  that increased  left skewness  was associated23
with better economic performance, for  given levels of the standard deviation and
kurtosis.  This  implies that  attributing  the  impact of  a  higher  standard
deviation to greater uncertainty is quite naive.
I  conclude with a  discussion of  the limitations  of the current  research and
some speculations.  The major limitation of this present paper is that only
unconditional RER innovations  were examined.  A model of RER fundamentals along
the lines  of Edwards, 1989, or El Badawi, 1991,  would allow the decomposition of
RER  changes  into  parts  due  to  changes  in  fundamentals  and  conditional
innovations.  This  also  would  allow  the  distinction  between  persistent
misalignment with infrequent corrections and pure variability especially due to
fundamentals as opposed to policy to be more clearly drawn  (Edwards, 1987).
Given the apparent importance of misalignment demonstrated previously, and the
importance  of  the distribution  of uncertainty  evidenced in  this  paper,  this seems
like  a  promising line  of research.  Also recent  theoretical work by Serven,  1991,
has suggested  that anticipated  devaluations  may inhibit  private  investment,  which
makes the  decomposition into conditional  and unconditional innovations  even  more
interesting.
Of course recommendations for exchange rate policy are impossible to draw
from simple cross country associations.  Nevertheless  this paper adds  to a
growing literature that  suggests that  countries that have dramatically mis-
managed their external policies have had inferior  economic performance.  Further
I would suggest that the importance of the higher order moments suggests that
while policy that produces a more variable exchange rate is bad, this may be
capturing  an effect  of unsustainable policies  that have  an  independent and
additional harmful  effect.  Infrequent large  changes in  the RER appear  to be  more
strongly  associated  with  poor  economic  performance  that  increases  in
"uncertainty" in the commonly used sense of higher variance.24
Appendix Table A.l: Skewness and kurtosis statistics on quarterly percentage
changeo in RER for 20 developing countries, 1963II-1988IV.
S,  S2
Country  skewness test  statistic  min-max/u  min/avg
(b 3)  on  bj
Argentina  -3.149  -14.322  -4.067  11.072
Bolivia  -1.684  -7.564  -1.765  10.606
Brazil  -0.567  -2.591  -0.429  4.595
Colombia  -0.775  -3.538  -1.795  7.659
Ecuador  -1.740  -7.913  -2.434  6.987
Paraguay  -2.204  -9.944  -2.298  7.909
Dominican  Rep  -8.092  -36.357  -8.437  28.531
Guatemala  -4.961  -22.382  -5.651  15.262
Honduras  -0.504  -2.304  -1.168  4.519
India  -1.800  -8.186  -3.212  8.351
Korea  -1.130  -4.258  -1.333  5.327
Malaysia  0.136  0.619  -0.346  5.100
Pakistan  -5.617  -25.548  -6.555  19.599
Philippines  -4.286  -19.571  -5.407  16.231
Sri  Lanka  -4.853  -22.162  -6.041  17.252
Thailand  -1.713  -7.138  -2.520  7.185
Tunisia  -0.668  -3.352  -1.649  6.064
Turkey  -2.554  -9.735  -3.545  8.338
Kenya  -0.589  -2.677  -0.926  4.937
Zambia  -3.362  -15.293  -2.920  16.543
Kurtosis  results
Country  kurtosis  test  statistic  SR
b4  on  b 4 std.  range
Argentina  15.207  35.918  8.377
Bolivia  10.403  24.298  8.206
Brazil  1.457  3.454  6.022
Colombia  6.121  14.510  8.252
Ecuador  4.551  10.750  6.160
Paraguay  7.757  18.185  6.551
Dominican  Rep  78.081  182.361  11.179
Guatemala  35.906  84.176  10.095
Honduras  1.159  2.747  5.726
India  8.070  19.061  8.074
Korea  3.129  6.236  6.203
Malaysia  2.011  4.749  6.938
Pakistan  40.566  95.815  9.846
Phiiippines  28.829  68.343  10.006
Sri  Lanka  36.193  85.801  10.585
Thailand  6.162  13.434  6.889
Tunisia  3.777  8.954  6.748
Turkey  10.637  21.420  6.944
Kenya  1.880  4.440  5.891
Zambia  26.654  62.955  11.19125
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